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On the 75th anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, an 
overlooked event has shaken nuclear politics. With its 50th ratifier, the 
Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW/Ban Treaty) is set to 
become binding. The pros and cons of that treaty, the possible consequences 
going forwards, and three possible future scenarios are worthy of analysis.
• Until now, nuclear bombs were the only weapons of mass destruction not for-
bidden by international law. Even though atomic powers hold legal obligations
to disarm, progress in that area is slow – if happening at all. The Ban Treaty
intends to fill this legal gap and speed up disarmament negotiations.
• The TPNW is a polemical treaty. Criticisms range from how broadly its text
was framed, to the lack of substance on technical procedures, to who it was
who negotiated it. Being a treaty boycotted by nuclear powers, critics point out
that it will not have any practical effect whatsoever – and, if somehow so, only
a negative one.
• Most criticisms overlook the normative foundations of the Ban Treaty, as well as 
its main target: creating, in the long run, an ideational and social environment
that enables a non-nuclear-weapons peace. It should be regarded as one more
instrument to pressure for nuclear disarmament and ensure non-proliferation.
Policy Implications
The entry into force of the Ban Treaty is, by itself, a relevant event, with conse-
quences for existing disarmament talks. Atomic arsenals will not be immediately 
dismantled. In the long run, however, increased public and social pressure may 
lead to an effective stimagitisation of nuclear weapons, rendering a nuclear-free 
world possible. With an active civil society and being a member of the Atlantic 
Alliance, Germany is in the position to become a bridge between state parties to 
and boycotters of the TPNW.
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The Rise of Nuclear Prohibitionism
October 2020 was an exciting month for those interested in the non-proliferation 
of nuclear weapons. On the 22nd, the United States sent a letter to all signatories 
of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), also known as the nu-
clear (weapon) ban treaty (Ban Treaty), urging them to withdraw from it (APNews 
2020). Only one day later, however, Jamaica and Nauru both ratified the nuclear 
ban, followed by Honduras on the 24th (which marked United Nations Day). With 
50 ratifications, the TPNW is now set to become binding within 90 days hence, and 
the first meeting of state parties should be convened within the next 12 months. 
Seventy-five years after the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Ban  Treaty 
brings a new legal norm that prohibits developing, testing, producing, manufactur-
ing, possessing, or stockpiling all kinds of nuclear explosive devices (Article 1, a). 
It is also a polemical and polarising treaty, with critics and supporters found all 
over the world. What the TPNW is, the countries that support it (and those that do 
not), and what to expect now that it will become binding are all examined. The Ban 
Treaty, it is argued, is a relevant legal and normative instrument, even if not having 
immediate practical effects. 
Eliminating nuclear weapons is an old ambition of international society, ex-
pressed in the very first resolution of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) 
from 1946. Since then, countries have developed a plethora of intertwined institu-
tions and organisations – a regime – aiming to get rid of atomic weapons. This re-
gime is centred on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), 
opened to signatures in 1967 and binding since 1970. The NPT is grounded in three 
pillars: non-proliferation (i.e. avoiding new countries going nuclear); nuclear dis-
armament; and, peaceful uses of atomic energy. Those pillars are also called “the 
grand bargain”: non-nuclear-weapon states agreed to close the atomic door, as 
long as nuclear-weapon states eliminated all of their own arsenals “in good faith” 
( Article VI of the NPT). Fifty years later, however, not a single bomb has ever been 
dismantled by the force of compulsion of a multilateral treaty. Nuclear disarma-
ment remains a thorny issue, and, until now, nuclear arms were the only kind of 
weapon of mass destruction yet to be banned globally. 
The bargain was not yet met. The Ban Treaty is, in that regard, first and fore-
most a reaction by non-nuclear-weapon states to the lack of progress in nuclear-
disarmament negotiations. They have run out of patience. Discussions on how to 
fulfil obligations under Article VI of the NPT regularly reach an impasse in all Re-
view Conferences. Countries with nuclear weapons and most of their allies advocate 
for a “step-by-step approach” to disarmament. According to this, irreversible, en-
forceable, and verifiable disarmament can only be achieved after establishing a safe 
international security environment and standing institutions that prevent duplicity. 
This is a long-term goal. 
In the year 2000 the NPT Review Conference approved the 13 practical steps to 
nuclear disarmament, following a draft proposal by the New Agenda Coalition – a 
group of geographically dispersed middle powers that do not belong to any  nuclear 
alliance. The 2010 NPT Review Conference drafted a road map on how to achieve 
verifiable disarmament, but nuclear powers rejected the proposed timeline. The Re-
view Conference also adopted the UN Secretary-General’s five-point proposal for 
nuclear disarmament, which included the call for negotiating a “Nuclear  Weapons 
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Convention,” similar to those tackling chemical and biological arms. Five years 
later, the 2015 NPT Review Conference was marked by the impasse reached. In 
the meantime, tensions between nuclear powers have risen, particularly after the 
2014 Russian annexation of Crimea, the growing stand-off in the South China Sea, 
and the 2016 election of Donald Trump – which was followed by the United States’ 
subsequent withdraw from the nuclear deal with Iran and from the Intermediate-
Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) too.
In parallel to all of that, a different perspective on nuclear weapons has been 
cemented in many non-nuclear-weapon states: the prohibitionist approach. Pro-
hibitionists propose to shift the focus from security-related issues to the societal 
and humanitarian impacts of atomic weapons. One of their main arguments is that 
institutions that  create norms against the possession of nuclear weapons can, and 
indeed should, precede the de facto elimination of atomic arsenals. Most propo-
nents even argue that those norms can create ideational conditions that enable full 
disarmament. Norms –  especially legal rules – could, therefore, speed up and en-
sure progress on nuclear  disarmament. 
A critical turning point that enabled the consolidation of the prohibitionist ap-
proach was the creation of the International Campaign for the Abolition of Nuclear 
Weapons (ICAN) in 2007. ICAN is a coalition of over 500 non-governmental organi-
sations across more than 100 countries. Inspired by the success of the International 
Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), ICAN campaigns for the complete elimination 
of nuclear weapons worldwide. It also coordinates civil society initiatives towards 
that goal. It was active in three major conferences on the humanitarian impacts of 
nuclear explosions: in March 2013, in Oslo (Norway); in February 2014, in Nayarit 
(Mexico); and in December 2014, in Vienna (Austria). In 2017, it was awarded the 
Nobel Peace Prize.
Those conferences led to the “Humanitarian Pledge,” calling for the “urgent 
and full implementation of existing [disarmament] obligations.” The Pledge urged 
countries to “stigmatise, prohibit, and eliminate” nuclear weapons. Some 127 coun-
tries signed it. In 2016, the UNGA adopted Resolution 71/258, convening a negoti-
ating conference to draft a binding instrument to ban atomic weapons. Negotiations 
took place in New York in September 2017 with the participation of 124 countries, 
but it was boycotted by all nuclear-weapon states and their allies – with the excep-
tion of the Netherlands. Of the participating countries, 122 voted in favour of the 
final text, while one voted against (the Netherlands) and one abstained (Singapore). 
The final text of the Ban Treaty was opened to signatures on 7 July 2017. It is set to 
become binding 90 days hence from 24 October 2020, when, as noted, Honduras 
became its 50th ratifier. 
What is the Ban Treaty, and Who is There?
The Ban Treaty is a broad instrument that creates a legal norm prohibiting the pos-
session of nuclear weapons. At its core it is a stigmatisation instrument, aimed at 
creating an ideational and societal environment compatible with a non-nuclear-
weapons peace. Behind it is the understanding that post–Second World War in-
ternational stability has been sustained not by the balance of terror but by the es-
tablishment of effective multilateral international institutions and the rule of law 
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– as highlighted by Costa Rican ambassador Elayne Gomez-White, who chaired the
negotiating conference (UN 2017, 0‘35‘‘ -5‘40‘‘). The aim is, therefore, to push for a
long-term environment in which nuclear weapons are rejected as barbarian instru-
ments of the past.
The TPNW is also a polemical treaty. Supporters argue that it is the first step 
towards a nuclear-free world. It is a broad treaty, but, nonetheless, a relevant one – 
“idealistic, but still relevant”. It was, furthermore, the result of an inclusive nego-
tiating process, which included civil society – through ICAN –, small states, and 
populations directly affected by nuclear explosions. Besides prohibiting nuclear ex-
plosive devices (Article 1), it also addresses gender issues (in the preamble), nucle-
ar-weapon-free zones (also in the preamble), the environmental impacts of nuclear 
explosions and remedies for that (Article 6), assistance to victims of nuclear tests 
(Article 7), and it bans deterrence theory (preamble). 
Critics argue that the scope of its text is far too vague. Article 4 (“Towards the 
Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons”) does not define the appropriate organisa-
tion to verify and oversee the disarmament procedure – it mentions instead only a 
“competent international authority.” It also does not address timelines to disarma-
ment, nor many of the 13 steps to nuclear disarmament already agreed in the NPT 
Review Conferences. Full adhesion to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
(CTBT) is, for instance, addressed merely in the preamble and there is no mention 
of negotiations towards a fissile material cut-off treaty – one of the most relevant 
phases of the step-by-step approach.
Participating countries
Most critiques focus, however, on who is in that treaty and on how it is relates to 
existing institutions (especially the NPT). The first stream of argumentation argues 
that the TPNW is either irrelevant or dangerous. It is considered irrelevant because 
it is composed of small and economically unimportant states that, in any case, are 
already nuclear-free (Alvim et al. 2017). The comparison between Figures 1 and 2 
below illustrates that argument. Figure 1 shows the positions of all countries vis-
à-vis the NPT (as of 25 October 2020). The universe of cases is 197 countries, as 
available in the ICAN ratifications monitor (ICAN 2020). Ratifiers (dark blue) are 
those countries that ratified the Ban Treaty. Signatories (light blue) are those who 
have signed but not yet ratified it. Boycotters (in red) are those that are officially 
against the treaty, and who voted against covening the negotiating conference too. 
 Supporters (in cream) are those that voted in favour of convening the negotiating 
conference and/or those that participated in it. Abstainers (in orange) are those 
abstained from voting in the resolution establishing the negotiating conference. 
Figure 1 shows that most supporters, signatories, and ratifiers of the Ban Treaty 
are countries indeed already covered by nuclear-weapon-free zones. Nuclear-weapon 
states and countries under atomic umbrellas partake in a boycott movement. This 
coincidence was, however, to be expected, as the genesis of the Ban Treaty is exactly 
the lack of progress in disarmament efforts. Having only nuclear-free states is also 
a positive development, as those countries until now had no permanent forum to 
assemble in so as to coordinate common positions. 
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Most supporters of the Ban Treaty are, furthermore, countries concentrated 
in the Global South – with the noteworthy exceptions of Austria, Ireland, and New 
Zealand. These are countries usually overlooked in non-proliferation and disarma-
ment policy, but which are gaining a new relevancy in defining nuclear politics. 
The whole of African and Latin American countries support, for instance, the Ban 
Treaty, as do most of those in Asia-Pacific and the Middle East. Most small island 
states – some of which, like the Maldives, were harmed by nuclear testing – are not 
only part of the treaty but were also among the first ratifiers. This explains why rati-
fiers are not among the world’s countries with the largest gross domestic products. 
Table 1 and Figure 3 below show some descriptive data on the basis of the 
universe of 197 countries, and some economic data from the World Bank. [1] It is 
evident herefrom that although supporters, ratifiers, and signatories make up of 
a large majority of countries worldwide (about 75 per cent), they also, as critics 
argue, are mostly small states or small economies. Relevant to highlight, however, 
is the fact that these figures do not reveal the support for the Ban Treaty inside 
boycotter countries themselves. ICAN itself, for instance, was founded in Australia, 
a boycotter of the Ban Treaty. In Germany, as another example, a 2019  YouGov 
Figure 1
Countries’ Positions 
on the TPNW (25 
October 2020)
Source: Author’s own 
representation, based on 
data form ICAN (2020). 
Note: Done with Map-
chart.net.
Figure 2
Nuclear-Weapon-
Free Zones
Source: UNODA.
1  World Bank (GDP) most 
countries had the latest 
data available for the year 
2019, with the following 
exceptions: Somalia (1990), 
Syria (2007), Eritrea (2011), 
Venezuela (2014), South 
Sudan (2015), Liechtenstein 
(2017), Iran (2017), Aruba 
(2017), Bhutan (2018), 
 Tonga (2018), Turk-
menistan (2018), Palestine 
(2018), Palau (2018), Micro-
nesia (2018), San Marino 
(2018), Yemen (2018), and 
the Marshall Islands (2018). 
Data for the Cook Islands 
(2016) and Nioue (2003) 
were taken from the CIA 
Factbook (CIA 2020).
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poll shows that 71 per cent of people think that their country should join the Ban 
Treaty (ICAN 2019) – even though another poll also shows that (in the meantime) 
only 31 per cent of Germans support forgoing all kinds of nuclear umbrella (Körber 
Stiftung 2019). 
Number of Countries % of World GDP % World Population
Ratifiers 50 (25.380%) 6.632% 12.197%
Signatories 34 (17.258%) 5.345% 16.209%
Supporters* 64 (32.487%) 7.887% 13.099%
Boycotters 37 (18.781%) 78.764 % 55.944%
Abstainers 13 (6.598%) 0.806% 2.551%
The data in table 1 above addresses two main critiques levied against the countries 
involved in drafting and signing the Ban Treaty: (1) that only small countries are 
involved, and they do not include the most relevant actors (the nuclear powers); 
(2) that only democracies would be affected by it. I tackle these two criticisms by
evaluating four empirical indicators: population and GDP (both with data from the
World Bank), military strength (with data from the the Global Fire Power Index),
and democracy levels (with data from the Freedom House). Data was acquired for
all 197 states, except regarding the FirePower Index – whose data for most small
countries is not available. All values were calibrated to be comparable, being situ-
ated on a continuum ranging from 0 (which assigns the minimum lower value for
each indicator) and 1 (which assigns the maximum value).
The countries participating in the Ban Treaty are indeed smaller economies in 
term of GDP. It is, however, not verifiable that they have smaller populations. The 
graphs comparing categories on the basis of population data from the World Bank 
shows that the universe of boycotters is skewed, due to the presence of countries 
like China, India, and the US – with large economies and populations alike. The 
same observation is true for military power – even though in that case the data is, 
as noted, incomplete. 
The second criticism is that a nuclear ban is dangerous because it will only 
be effective against the “good” democratic states, while “bad” autocracies will not 
feel pressured to disarm. This argument was first stated by US ambassador to the 
UN Nikki Haley in a press conference held in July 2017 (UN 2017a; Halley 2017). 
Data from Freedom House shows, however, that even though boycotters are indeed 
mostly democratic coutries – and therefore more susceptible to domestic public 
opinion pressures – ratifiers and signatores are not. The diversity of the countries 
participating (ratifiers, signatories, and supporters) indicates that the democratic 
argument should be, at least, reframed. 
Table 1
Descriptive Data
Sources: CIA Factbook 
(2020), ICAN (2020), 
World Bank (2019), 
Global Fire Power Index 
(2020). 
Notes: *Includes the 
Netherlands. N=197 
states.
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Relations with the NPT
Another stream of criticism, in fact, focuses on the relations between the Ban Treaty 
and the NPT. Critics argue that the former will weaken the latter, as it will dilute 
efforts across multiple arenas of negotiation. Bringing everyone to the NPT was 
already a long and exhausting process. It started seeing some success only in the 
1990s, after the end of the Cold War and, more importantly, the 1995 indefinite 
extension of the NPT – when disarmament pledges were renewed. Today, only five 
countries are on the outside of the NPT: India, Israel, North Korea (withdrawn), Pa-
kistan, and South Sudan. From those, only South Sudan is not considered a  pariah 
on non-proliferation issues. Critics argue, therefore, that creating a new “compet-
ing” institution would harm the NPT, with new efforts being discussed outside 
its Review Conferences. Those endeavours would, furthermore, be innocuous, as 
armed states would not be involved. A universal – albeit imperfect – institution 
(the NPT) hence risks being substituted by an ineffective and restricted forum. If 
anything, nuclear-weapon states would try to oppose it by resuming development 
of such arms. 
This argument has two main problems to it. First, it ignores that multiple in-
stitutions already shape the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and they are uni-
versally seen as complementary rather than competing. They reinforce rather than 
weaken one another. A similar argument was, indeed, employed in the 1960s to 
criticise the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Before the 1962 Cuban Missile 
Crisis, Latin American states – pressured by the US – rejected the concept of nu-
clear-weapon-free zones, arguing that regional-centred treaties would not only be 
ineffective but they would also divert attention away from global non-proliferation 
and disarmament negotiations held in Geneva and New York (Wrobel 2017). Today, 
however, these regional treaties are vital to ensure the stability of regional non-nu-
clear environments. A similar trend is expected with the Ban Treaty. The preamble 
thereof reaffirms, indeed, the NPT as “the cornerstone of the nuclear disarmament 
and non-proliferation regime.”
Figure 3
Comparative 
Descriptive Data 
(Calibrated)
Source: Authors’ own 
representation, based on 
data from the ICAN, the 
Freedom House, the 
World Bank, the Global 
Fire Power Index. 
Legend: Not = 
Abstainers; Rat = Rati-
fiers; Sig = Signatories; 
Sup = Supporters; Bot = 
Boycotters.
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And Now, What? Three Possible Scenarios
Despite all the above-mentioned critiques, the Ban Treaty is out there. And it is 
soon to be legally binding. The TPNW has already shown its relevance merely by 
existing – being the first multilateral nuclear arms control and disarmament treaty 
fully negotiated since the CTBT, which despite being opened to signatures in 1996 
is still not binding. It represents the ultimate achievement of a global civil society 
movement against nuclear weapons and a self-evident manifestation of an ever-
more multipolar international order. Three possible scenarios going forwards are 
worthy of consideration in closing: success, failure, irrelevance. 
The first scenario is that of success. It follows as such: in the medium run, the 
Ban Treaty becomes a forum where non-nuclear-weapon states discuss common 
positions and find consensual approaches to pressure for disarmament. The Ban 
 Treaty conferences become a socialising forum, in many ways similar to what al-
ready happens in nuclear-weapon-free zones like Latin America. Small states join 
forces, and increase their leveraging power in disarmament negotiations. The  treaty 
eventually attracts some members of nuclear alliances, like the North  Atlantic 
 Treaty Organization, even if only as observers. For that, civil society mobilisation 
was  central. More cohesion among the non-nuclear-weapon majority oversees a 
revival of the negotiations within the NPT Review Conferences. Nuclear-weapon 
states and their allies react by making progress on the basis of a step-by-step ap-
proach. In the long run, it leads the whole of international society to stigmatise 
atomic weapons – to the point that keeping hold of costly and anachronic nuclear 
arsenals becomes politically unbearable. Just like had happened previously with 
overt chemical and biological arsenals. Leaders finally negotiate a fissile  material 
cut-off treaty. The CTBT also comes into force. Soon after, countries dismantle 
their atomic arsenals voluntarily, and they sign comprehensive nuclear safeguard 
agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency. Dissenters are further 
reproached as pariahs or even outlaws.
The second scenario is that of failure. It follows as such: realpolitik and de-
terrence logics impose themselves, as competition and disagreements between 
nuclear-weapon states increase. Gradually, larger state parties – like Brazil, Indo-
nesia, Malaysia, or Nigeria – lose interest in the Ban Treaty. Some of them did not 
even ratify it in the first place. Other countries may even withdraw from the TPNW, 
pressured into doing so by nuclear-weapon states. Idealistic small states have their 
call unheard, and are left alone. The divide between nuclear-weapon haves and 
have-nots becomes a chasm. The Ban Treaty’s limited effect is restricted to small 
democracies alone, some of them left unprotected by nuclear umbrellas. Further 
proliferation is even likely to occur, as contestation of the step-by-step approach 
leads to a loss of credibility. The Ban Treaty becomes one more forgotten historical 
experiment – just like the 1976 Threshold Test Ban Treaty, which was set to lay the 
grounds for “peaceful nuclear explosions.” 
The last scenario is that of irrelevance. It is grounded in the assumption that 
all of the pros and cons arguments overstate the real value of the Ban Treaty. In the 
end, it was, in fact, so general and so broad that it failed to have any impact at all. 
The impasse within the NPT Review Conferences continues, and the slow progress 
on the step-by-step approach remains. In fact, it may even slow down further. It is 
business as usual. Maybe in the long run, once progress on nuclear disarmament 
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negotiations has resumed, countries convene again – this time with the participa-
tion of the remaining nuclear powers, so as to discuss a more detailed and specific 
Nuclear Weapons Convention. This is, nonetheless, more likely to occur only if new 
technologies render atomic arsenals obsolete. In that case, we will all have a new 
problem besides.
In 2017, negotiators believed that the “success scenario” was feasible and even 
expected in the long run. When staring at the past, they attempt to mirror prior 
achievements — such as outlawing chemical weapons. In this regard, the path that 
led to the 1992 Chemical Weapons Convention was paved by the work of and the 
normative statements produced by the 1968 18-Nation Disarmament Committee. 
Regarding chemical weapons, 24 years were thus needed in order to see some prac-
tical results (which is much less than the 50 years and counting required since the 
signature of the NPT). It is, however, grounded in the premise that the moral and 
normative value of the treaty would superimpose the comparatively lower material 
capabilities of its member states. As shown, however, these states are not as weak 
as they seem, particularly when looking at the number involved and when consider-
ing the role of civil society organisations like ICAN. The “success” scenario remains, 
therefore, a very likely one in the long run. 
The “failure” and the “irrelevance” scenarios are in line with the worst predic-
tions by opponents of the Ban Treaty. They are grounded in concerns regarding the 
nature of the participating countries in the Ban Treaty and relations with existing 
institutions, mainly the NPT. These scenarios focus on realpolitik and overlook the 
very elements that enabled the draft of the TPNW in the first place, like the success-
ful “hallway” diplomacy pursued by civil society. This cilivian rooting, as well as the 
moral principle sustaining the concept of a nuclear ban, should render the “failure” 
scenario unlikely. The irrelevance one, however, is still a possibility, particularly 
when considering the fast-paced advances in dual-use technologies like artificial 
intelligence and automated machines. 
What will likely occur is something in between success and irrelevance, de-
pending, first and foremost, on the actions of the countries outside of the TPNW. 
The nuclear ban will probably not lead to the immediate dismantling of atomic 
arsenals. In the long run, however, it will most likely become a powerful norma-
tive instrument – even if substituted in future by a more precise Nuclear Weapon 
Convention. This normative force derives from the growing repudiation of nuclear 
weapons. This repulsion has gained ground both among civil society and the vast 
majority of countries worldwide. The extent to which the Ban Treaty will impact 
other countries and institutions, particularly the NPT Review Conferences, is yet to 
be seen. Prospects are, however, so far positive. 
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